Sociopaths = slightly less violent than toddlers

David Dobbs writes for the NY Times about the progression from violent toddlers (everyone), to become less violent children (most everyone) to becoming hardly violent at all adults (a lot of people):

To understand the violent criminal, says Richard E. Tremblay, imagine a 2-year-old boy doing the things that make the terrible twos terrible — grabbing, kicking, pushing, punching, biting.

Now imagine him doing all this with the body and resources of an 18-year-old.

You have just pictured both a perfectly normal toddler and a typical violent criminal as Dr. Tremblay, a developmental psychologist at University College Dublin in Ireland, sees them — the toddler as a creature who reflexively uses physical aggression to get what he wants; the criminal as the rare person who has never learned to do otherwise.

In other words, dangerous criminals don’t turn violent. They just stay that way.
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“It’s highly reliable,” said Brad J. Bushman, a psychology professor at Ohio State University and an expert on child violence, who noted that toddlers use physical aggression even more than people in violent youth gangs do. “Thank God toddlers don’t carry weapons.”
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The rate of violence peaks at 24 months, declines steadily through adolescence and plunges in early adulthood. But as Dr. Tremblay and Daniel S. Nagin, a criminologist at Carnegie Mellon University, found in a pivotal 1999 study, a troublesome few do not follow this pattern.
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To Dr. Tremblay, the findings suggest cause for optimism: that humans more readily learn civility than they do cruelty.

We start as toddlers. We learn through conditioning, as we heed requests not to hit others but to use our words. We learn self-control. Beginning in our third year, we learn social strategies like bargaining and charm. Perhaps most vital, we use a developing brain to read situations and choose among these learned tactics and strategies.

I wonder if the non-violent sociopaths were the ones that as children started focusing more on negotiation and charm to get their way (as opposed to the violent sociopaths who remained heavy-handed in their techniques).

The rest article is interesting, especially when it discusses how Tremblay became interested in human violence only because he grew up with a father who was a professional football player and was fascinated that there were certain areas of life in which violence was not only accepted, it was praised. See also, glorification of violence in media, video games, and many other areas of our entertainment lives.

Labels = license to do ill?

I have been asked recently about whether I think that there is any danger that people will falsely self-identify as sociopaths and then use that label as an excuse to behave poorly. I think that labels definitely do affect the way people behave. David Dobbs wrote about how schizophrenics are treated in North America nations versus African nations, suggesting that because the disorder is considered more of a temporary aberration in some African cultures (as opposed to the sense that it is a full blown disability in western nations), African schizophrenics are more high-functioning. The theory is that western schizophrenics aren't expected to act normally so they don't, at least not as often as African schizophrenics. Of course I'm sure there's a lot more going on to explain the difference, but there is still a lot of power to a label.

So I think this is a legitimate concern, often acceptance of a label leads to better behavior through the process of reappropriaatinon. An academic article, "The Reappropriation of Stigmatizing Labels: Implications for Social Identity" describes the process:

Given that to appropriate means “to take possession of or make use of exclusively for oneself,” we consider reappropriate to mean to take possession for oneself that which was once possessed by another, and we use it to refer to the phenomenon whereby a stigmatized group revalues an externally imposed negative label by selfconsciously referring to itself in terms of that label. Instead of passively accepting the negative connotative meanings of the label, the speaker above rejected those damaging meanings and through reappropriation imbued the label with positive connotations. By reappropriating this negative label, he sought to renegotiate the meaning of the word, changing it from something hurtful to something empowering. His actions imply two assumptions that are critical to reappropriation. First, names are powerful, and second, the meanings of names are subject to change and can be negotiated and renegotiated.

It's probably obvious why reappropriation or a label is appealing to members of a stigmatized class of persons:

Stigma, according to Goffman, is an attribute that discredits and reduces the person “from a whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted one” (Goffman, 1963, p. 3). Social stigma links a negatively valued attribute to a social identity or group membership. Stigma is said to exist when individuals “possess (or are believed to possess) some attribute, or characteristic, that conveys a social identity that is devalued in a particular social context”. 
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Being stigmatized carries with it a number of burdens. First and foremost, stigmatized persons are disadvantaged in terms of opportunities they are afforded and the outcomes that they achieve. Overt and covert prejudice and discrimination can deny the stigmatized entry into elite stations in life, from education to jobs to housing.
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Stigma, like categorization (Wittenbrink, Judd & Park, 2001) and stereotype threat (Steele & Aronson, 1995), is context-dependent (Crocker, Major & Steele, 1998). Thus, an individual may be stigmatized in one context but not in another context. In different cultures and in different times, groups such as the overweight or gays have not been burdened with stigma. Instead, these features are or were considered normal, or, in some cases, desirable (Archer, 1985). Intellectual ambition may be lauded in one context (e.g. classroom) but derided in another context (e.g. fraternity) or by another group (e.g. disadvantaged inner city youths). It is the variability of stigma that intrigues us. It suggests that what is considered stigmatizing is socially constructed and, in the end, malleable. In the case of stereotype threat, a social category label takes on negative connotations within a particular context. One approach to decreasing stereotype threat, and thereby to reduce the potentially performance-constraining effects of stigma, is to frame the task as non-diagnostic of underlying ability (Steele & Aronson, 1995). An alternative approach, which is the focus of this chapter, is to transform the connotative meaning of the traits that are linked to the social category, revaluing them positively. Reappropriation, typically in the form of self-labeling, is one strategy that attempts to revalue social identities. Reappropriation and other socially creative strategies are possible because of the situational, socially constructed, and thus malleable nature of stigma.

How and why reappropriation?

Where “queer” had connoted undesirable abnormality, by the fact that it is used by the group to refer to itself, it comes to connote pride in the groups’ unique characteristics. Where before it referred to despised distinctiveness, it now refers to celebrated distinctiveness. Reappropriation allows the label’s seemingly stable meaning to be open to negotiation. In addition, the defiant act of reappropriation may attack the negative evaluations of the denoted group. By refusing to perceive “queer” as demeaning, in-group members make it more difficult for out-group members to gain recognition for their own display of superiority, thereby undermining one of the functions of prejudice (Fein & Spencer, 1997). The ability of reappropriation to deprive outgroup members of a linguistic weapon is nicely exemplified in an episode of The Simpsons. In this episode, Homer becomes angry with a gay character for using the word queer to describe himself, yelling “And another thing. You can’t use the word queer... that is ourword for you.” This example emphasizes that implicit in the concept of reappropriation is the idea that language is an ongoing process of negotiation, a power struggle over the connotative meaning of symbolic referents. As such, self-labeling can serve to diffuse the negative connotations of the word. Further, by reclaiming names formerly soaked in derision, an individual exerts his or her agency and proclaims his or her rejection of the presumed moral order.

In successful reappropriation, an alternative vision is presented that does not necessarily change the underlying denotative meaning of a concept but transforms the connotative evaluative implications. In the case of “queer,” reappropriation implies that deviance or abnormality is itself not necessarily a bad thing, thereby promoting a celebration of diversity. Through reappropriation, the implication of distinctiveness in the term “queer” was not disputed or challenged, but rather the evaluative meaning that it connoted was transformed. Via reappropriation, the group asserts that it is still unique, or exceptional, but that exceptionality is positively valued. The distinctiveness of the group and the label is maintained, but it is simply the negativity that is challenged.

The rest of the article details a model of misappropriation. But yes, there is a very real danger to labels, both in people self-identifying strongly with a label and possibly the normalizing of certain behaviors via reappropriation of the label. Those are the natural consequences of labels. But, they are not necessarily bad consequences, particularly when the label has been overly stigmatized and the reappropriation of the term allows the label to reflect more truthful connotations as part of a larger cultural re-evaluation of the stigma, as well as allowing the stigmatized group to reintegrate themselves into a society that is seeking to exclude or subjugate them.

But don't sociopaths deserve their stigma? If you look at the core personality traits of a sociopath, they are not necessarily negative, but neutral or even positive -- charm, confidence, fearlessness, etc. As the article mentions:

Traits often take on different connotative meanings when placed in the context of the in-group versus the out-group. For example, intelligence when describing Jews (when they are an out-group) may be interpreted negatively as conniving. With regard to group-based evaluations (Brewer, 1979), loyal may be considered positively when describing the in-group, but take on negative connotations, such as clannish or exclusionary, when describing the out-group. Galinsky and Moskowitz (2000) presented traits in the context of the in-group and the outgroup and asked participants to rate the favorability of each trait (cf.Esses & Zanna, 1995). Traits were rated less favorably in the context of the out-group, even when the assignment of traits did not differ. 

Pigeonhole diagnosis

Some people wonder why I want to be out at all -- if I am successfully passing and living a fulfilling life, why not just keep doing that? Part of me likes the fun and intrigue involved in my attempts to pass and the ability to hide in plain sight. Part of me is also resentful of the mental energy required for that task. I wonder what my life and brain would look like if I didn't feel compelled to mask certain things and constantly be putting on a show. If I've managed a certain level of success from without the system, what might I be able to accomplish within?

I was reading this Wired article by David Dobbs, author of the well-known article in the Atlantic comparing children to either Orchids or Dandelions (which are sociopath children? the answer may surprise you). In this article he discusses how our society treats those with mental illnesses, specifically schizophrenia:


A large  World Health Organization study, for instance, found that “Whereas 40 percent of schizophrenics in industrialized nations were judged over time to be ‘severely impaired,’ only 24 percent of patients in the poorer countries ended up similarly disabled.’ Their symptoms also differed, in the texture, intensity, and subject matter to their hallucinations or paranoia, for instance. And most crucially, in many cases their mental states did not disrupt their connections to family and society.

Watters, curious about all this, went to Zanzibar to see how all this worked. He learned that there, schizophrenia was seen partly as an especially intense inhabitation of spirits — bad mojo of the sort everyone had, as it were. This led people to see psychotic episodes  less as complete breaks from reality than a passing phenomena, somewhat as we might view, say, a friend or coworker’s intermittent memory lapses.

For instance, in one household Watters came to know well, a woman with schizophrenia, Kimwana,

was allowed to drift back and forth from illness to relative health without much monitoring or comment by the rest of the family. Periods of troubled behavior were not greeted with expressions of concern or alarm, and neither were times of wellness celebrated. As such, Kimwana felt little pressure to self-identify as someone with a permanent mental illness.

This was rooted partly in the idea of spirit possession already mentioned, and partly to an accepting fatalism in the brand of Sunni that the family practiced. Allah, they believed, would not burden any one person with more than she could carry. So they carried on, in acceptance rather than panic. As a result, this delusional, hallucinating, sometimes disoriented young woman passed into and out of her more disoriented mental states while still keeping her basic place in family, village, and work life, rather than being cast aside. Almost certainly as a result, she did not feel alienated, and her hallucinations did not include the sort of out-to-get-me kind that mark paranoid schizophrenics in the West.

This, writes Watters in enormous understatement, “stood in contrast with the diagnosis of schizophrenia as [used] in the West. There the diagnosis carries the assumption of a chronic condition, one that often comes to define a person.”


Of course I'm not stupid about wanting to out myself completely and without proper care. Dobbs goes on to describe the complete ostracizing of a Western schizophrenic from her friends and academic community upon her diagnosis. But I do wonder what effects struggling to conform to a particular societal standard of superficial normality has had on me. Perhaps I wonder so much because my family actually is really supportive, like the family of the woman Kimwana. I often credit their support for how I turned out, particularly their religious beliefs that I would not be burdened with more than I could carry. And so my sociopathy does not define me. I wonder if society were equally supportive, what a difference that might make?

The dandelions and the orchids

A reader writes:

I thought this David Dobbs article in The Atlantic was fascinating and I will add, personally gratifying. It’s saying in effect that personality traits that are so often deemed deleterious by society can indeed be not only adaptive but advantageous in certain environments. It specifically mentions “antisocial” behavior several times. I found it gratifying because it’s something that I’ve thought and voiced in my own way several times, only I didn’t have any research to back me up. My opinion was based on deduction rather than science. Now thanks to this article, I’ve got some scientific findings to turn to support my observations. Of course, the research is still young, but it’s promising. Actually, it’s commonsensical and even obvious when you think about it. There isn’t anything particularly revolutionary about it. Well, it’s radical only if you believed the myth that so called bad traits had no redeeming value whatsoever.

So all those people who are so certain that traits associated with sociopathy, psychopathy and antisocial behavior and thinking are nothing more than a curse on society that must be eradicated as soon as possible can go suck it! LOL.

Anyway, here's the link to the article: http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200912/dobbs-orchid-gene